Enforcement

Export enforcement: 10 real cases

What went wrong, what it cost, and the check that would have flagged it. Every case comes from a public U.S. enforcement action.

Names withheld and details simplified. Penalties are rounded. Export Control Studio gives preliminary screening only. It does not clear a shipment or give legal advice.

Know who is really on the other end

These companies knew the rules. A listed party got through because it wasn't the name on the order.

Commerce (BIS) · Self-disclosed2024

A chip-wafer maker shipped to a listed firm its customer picked

Shipped $17MPenalty $500,000

About $17 million of wafers went out in 74 shipments to a Chinese assembly-and-test firm on the Entity List. The customer chose the firm. A data-entry error kept it out of the screening system.

Lesson: Include every party in the deal when you screen, including the ones your customer picks.

Would have flagged it: Party screening with every party entered, including the firm doing the work.

Treasury (OFAC) · Commerce (BIS) · Self-disclosed (OFAC)2023

A software company's staff sold licenses to listed parties under other names

Penalty about $3.3 million

Staff at a Russian subsidiary ordered licenses in the names of unlisted companies, or added them to unlisted affiliates' agreements. Listed and sanctioned end users got the software.

Lesson: The name on the contract isn't always the real end user.

Would have flagged it: Screening the actual end user, and the reseller or affiliate as a separate party.

Commerce (BIS) · Justice (DOJ)2025

A chip-design software company sold to a military university under a front name

Shipped $45MPenalty $95 million

About $45 million of design software, hardware and technology went to an account under a different name, years after the university was put on the Entity List. The equipment was installed on its campus, and the two shared staff.

The $95 million is the Commerce penalty. A separate Justice Department agreement added forfeiture.

Lesson: A different name on the account doesn't change who the end user is.

Would have flagged it: Party screening of the real end user, not just the account holder.

Sending it another way doesn't change the rule

Making or finishing the item abroad didn't take it outside U.S. rules.

Commerce (BIS)2026

A chipmaking-equipment maker routed tools through South Korea to a listed customer

Shipped $126MPenalty about $252 million

After a Chinese chipmaker was put on the Entity List, about $126 million of equipment went to the company's own unit in South Korea for assembly, then on to China, with no license.

Twice the value of the shipments, the most the law allows.

Lesson: Sending it through another country doesn't remove the license requirement.

Would have flagged it: Party screening of the final customer, not just the first stop.

Commerce (BIS)2023

A data-storage maker kept selling foreign-made drives to a listed telecom company

Shipped $1.1BPenalty $300 million

More than 7 million hard drives made outside the U.S. went to a Chinese telecom company on the Entity List. A special rule covers some foreign-made items built with U.S. technology. Competitors stopped selling; this company kept going.

Lesson: “Made abroad” doesn't always mean “outside U.S. rules”.

Would have flagged it: Party screening, which shows the listed customer and the Entity List note that reaches foreign-made items.

EAR99 isn't a free pass

EAR99 items are low-control, but some still need a license, depending on the destination and the buyer.

Commerce (BIS) · Treasury (OFAC)2025

A machine-tool maker sold spare parts to listed defense companies

Shipped $29KPenalty about $2.5 million

About $29,000 of EAR99 parts went through distributors to service machines owned by Entity List parties in China and Russia. Some export filings were also wrong.

Lesson: Small parts count, and so does who owns the machine.

Would have flagged it: Party screening of the machine's owner before each service sale.

Commerce (BIS)2024

An electronics-materials supplier shipped EAR99 solder to Russia

Shipped $97KPenalty $180,000

About $97,000 of solder went to Russia in 11 shipments, through freight forwarders that were later sanctioned. The items were EAR99, but their tariff codes were on a Russia list that requires a license. Red flags were missed.

Lesson: For Russia, the tariff code can decide whether you need a license.

Would have flagged it: The license check, which warns that EAR99 items to Russia can still need a license by tariff code. You then check the code.

Emails, employees and samples are exports too

Not every export is a crate on a truck.

Commerce (BIS) · State (DDTC) · Justice (DOJ)2023

A 3D-printing company emailed controlled drawings to its office in China

Penalty about $2.8 million

Aerospace and military design drawings went by email to the company's China office to prepare price quotes. Copies sat on an email server in Germany. A controlled metal powder also went to China without a license.

The $2.8 million is the Commerce penalty. State and Justice settled separately.

Lesson: Drawings need a classification too, before they leave by email or the cloud.

Would have flagged it: Find the ECCN for the drawings (technology has its own entries), then a license check for China.

State (DDTC) · Self-disclosed2024

An aerospace manufacturer shared defense data with foreign-national staff

Penalty $51 million

Defense technical data went to foreign-national employees and contractors without authorization. Some items went to China, and some license terms were broken: 199 violations in all.

$24 million of the penalty was suspended for compliance improvements.

Lesson: Showing ITAR data to a foreign-national employee counts as exporting it to their country.

Would have flagged it: An ITAR check using the person's country, before they get access.

Commerce (BIS) · Self-disclosed2021

A research university mailed pathogen samples abroad

Shipped $27KPenalty $54,000

37 shipments of animal pathogen strains, about $27,000 worth, went to overseas labs over four years. They were controlled for chemical and biological weapons reasons. No license was obtained.

Lesson: Research samples sent to colleagues are exports, even when they're cheap.

Would have flagged it: A license check on the pathogen's ECCN, which names the chemical and biological weapons control.